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This article takes a comparative, empirical look at the practice of Irish neutrality during the 
World War II.  It critiques a model of neutrality presented in a thesis on Irish neutrality called 
Unneutral Ireland, consisting of factors derived from an analysis of three states regarded as 
well-established European neutrals, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland that reflect the practice 
of neutrality.  That model focused on the rights and duties of neutrality; the recognition of 
Ireland’s status by belligerents and others; the disavowal of external help; and the freedom of 
decision and action.  This present article focuses on the factors flowing from these latter 
obligations that are cited in an analysis of the practice of Irish neutrality, in the Unneutral 
thesis as proof of Ireland’s ‘unneutral’ status, i.e. ideology; involvement in economic 
sanctions; partiality; the practice of Irish citizens joining the British army; and post-World 
War II factors such as Ireland’s EEC membership.  In this article, Ireland’s practice of 
neutrality is evaluated against the practice of other European neutral states - Sweden, 
Switzerland, Austria and Finland (including Norway’s truncated practice of neutrality) - vis-
à-vis the above variables.  This article also deals with the perennial myths that crop up in 
‘unneutral’ discourses on Irish neutrality, for example, the oft-cited incidence of de Valera’s 
alleged visit to the German legation in Ireland to sign a book of condolences on Hitler’s death 
and the suggestions of a British government offer of a deal on Northern Ireland in exchange 
for Ireland dropping its neutral stance and supporting the Allies in World War II.  The article 
concludes that the practice of Irish neutrality is equivalent to or superior to the practice of 
other European neutral states, thus undermining the dominant discourse that Ireland’s 




A discourse produced by a number of academics, journalists and political elites claims that Irish 
neutrality is a ‘myth’, because the alleged inadequate practice of Irish neutrality during the Second 
World War vis-à-vis a conceptual model of neutrality renders Ireland ‘unneutral’.  This conclusion, 
that Ireland’s neutrality does not exist1, is reflected in much of the academic discourse on Irish 
neutrality2 and is echoed in the media discourse.3  Discourses propounding the conceptual metaphors 
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that Irish neutrality is mythical or ‘unneutral’ are pertinent to examine, given the current significance 
of Irish neutrality for a proportion of the electorate who vote against EU Treaties in referenda due to 
perceived threats to neutrality arising from proposals for progressive European integration in the area 
of security and defence.4   The repetition of these negative discourses on Irish neutrality has the effect 
of ‘sedimenting’ the ‘unneutral’ and ‘myth’ metaphors, i.e. such discourses become ‘common sense’ 
and may, over time, constitute deeply internalized structures that people exposed to the discourse take 
for granted and as natural.5  Such discursive structures are argued to have causal effects that are linked 
to policy:  
 
Discursive structures are ‘systems of rules which make it possible for certain statements but 
not others to occur at particular times, places and institutional locations’....they facilitate 
certain policies while making others more difficult....prepare us for some avenues of social 
change, making them widely expected, but also prevent us from perceiving alternative 
avenues of change.6   
 
These ‘myth’ and ‘unneutral’ discourses are propounded by many elites who advocate Ireland’s 
participation in NATO and/or a European Union (EU) military alliance, and who support the more 
recent, concrete plans to build up EU military capabilities (with an associated hypothesised rationale 
to rival US military hegemony7) proposed in the Lisbon Treaty.8  Irish neutrality is a barrier to these 
policies, and the ‘unneutral’ and ‘myth’ discourses are produced and reproduced to undermine the 
value and status of Irish neutrality as part of the strategy to persuade voters to acquiesce to the 
proposed EU military and defence policy goals. 
 
This article critiques the Unneutral thesis’s premise of deriving its model of neutrality from 
well-established practitioners of neutrality, namely Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.  It reviews the 
Unneutral analysis of the model’s variables with respect to Ireland, specifically, the variables of “the 
rights and duties of neutrality [broken down into (1) due diligence and defence resources, (2) defence 
expenditure and costs of attack, and (3) supplies, trade and economic dependence]; the recognition of 
Ireland’s status by belligerents and others; the disavowal of external help; and the freedom of decision 
and action”.9  It also reviews some ancillary factors that are cited in Unneutral Ireland as additional 
evidence that Ireland is unneutral, specifically, ‘ideology’, ‘involvement in economic sanctions’ and 
‘impartiality’10 and the fact that Irish citizens joined the British army.11  Finally, the article considers 
the perennial issues that crop up in the ‘unneutral’ discourses: de Valera’s alleged visit to the German 
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legation in Ireland to sign a book of condolences on Hitler’s death12 and the suggestion that de Valera 
was open to a deal on Northern Ireland in exchange for Ireland’s neutrality during the war,13 as well 
as post-World War II factors such as Ireland’s membership of the EEC.14 The argument of this article 
is that if the behaviours of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were fairly evaluated, each of them 
would also be deemed ‘unneutral’ alongside Ireland, because each state violated these variables to an 
equal or greater extent.  This conclusion gives rise to the following propositions: either the model of 
neutrality in the Unneutral thesis effectively defines neutrality out of existence, and is thus unhelpful 
in a fair and realistic evaluation of the practice of any state’s neutrality; or the Irish practice of 
neutrality is not ‘unneutral’ by comparison with the above-named neutral states and Ireland was, in 
some respects, arguably more neutral than these others.    
 
CRITIQUE OF THE MODEL 
 
The first problem with the approach to formulating the model of variables used to evaluate Ireland’s 
neutrality in the Unneutral thesis concerns tautology.  The thesis takes Austria, Sweden and 
Switzerland as neutral states because they are “universally regarded as such”, because they are 
“commonly identified as neutral…in the literature”.15 Using a common, inter-subjective belief that 
these states are neutral states to identify them as exemplars of a concept of neutrality, rather than 
arriving at this classification by analysing the practice of their neutrality, is a flawed basis for the 
formulation of the model.  The Unneutral thesis does not evaluate both Ireland’s neutrality and the 
practice of neutrality of these neutral states vis-à-vis its model of neutrality variables.  There is no 
systematic analysis in the Unneutral thesis evaluating whether these neutral states adhered to the 
variables of neutrality.  Only Ireland is evaluated against these variables, and is found wanting, to the 
extent that a dominant discourse is in operation that Ireland is ‘unneutral’.   
 
Garret FitzGerald also argues that Irish neutrality is a myth, on the same basis of a 
comparison with other neutral states, which he claims have had much more clear-cut concepts of 
neutrality than Ireland.16 FitzGerald contends that  
 
it is at least questionable whether Ireland can properly be described as having been “neutral”, 
because the scale of assistance given secretly to Britain was scarcely compatible with the 
concept of neutrality under International Law’.17   
 
And it is not just the proponents of the ‘unneutral’ discourse in Ireland, but also “both great power 
blocs, and all the more, the Continental neutrals”18 who have viewed Ireland’s practice of neutrality as 
“sui generis”.  Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the neutrality of Sweden, Switzerland and Austria as 
well as that of Ireland against those variables of the model, to establish whether Irish neutrality really 
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is all that different from the neutrality practised by European neutral states during and after the 
Second World War. 
The second problem with how the Unneutral thesis evaluated Ireland’s neutrality concerns the 
proposition that if each of those neutral states violated many elements of the thesis’s model of 
neutrality, they would also be deemed ‘unneutral’.  The approach of evaluating the failures of each 
state on a ‘sortal’ rather than a ‘scalar’ basis effectively defines neutrality out of existence.  The 
problem is that there is no indication of a hierarchy of the variables in the model, of which variables 
are fundamental to the concept of neutrality and which variables are auxiliary.  Is it possible to violate 
auxiliary elements of neutrality and still be considered a neutral state?  Or is it the case that a violation 
of just one variable of the model renders a state ‘unneutral’?  Does a state have to violate all of the 
variables to be deemed ‘unneutral’?  This is not made clear. Although it is possible to argue for a 
scalar concept of neutrality that allows violations of some variables in the model, the specification of 
such conditions would be political and contested.  This issue pervades the following comparative 
analysis of European neutral states’ policies and practices of neutrality. 
 
Benevolence and Concessions 
 
Ireland did give assistance to Britain during the war in terms of shipping, emigration and aviation 
policy19; for example, de Valera came up with “an ingenious plan to help Britain while at the same 
time preserving the appearance of strict neutrality”.20 Once the Irish authorities located a submarine, 
information on its whereabouts would be radioed “to the world”.21  This would not be of assistance to 
the Germans because they were too far from Ireland to use the information, but Britain could take 
action.22 However, most of the actions were mutually beneficial. It was out of a determination to 
remain neutral that De Valera denied the British the cooperation from Ireland they wanted most:23 the 
return of the Treaty Ports to British hands, and as a result, Irish neutrality was never legally 
compromised. Bill McSweeney reasoned that Ireland’s “defence was backed up by some ostentatious 
displays of military impartiality and other, less public, concessions to the Allied cause which were 
deemed necessary to pacify an outraged Westminster government”.24 
Arguably, Salmon and FitzGerald’s point about Ireland’s alleged lack of adherence to the 
international law of neutrality could apply to all of the neutral states, not just Ireland. As Risto Pentillä 
explains, the World Wars shattered the idea of strict, impartial neutrality because those who were able 
to stay out of the war (many neutral states were invaded) had to compromise their neutrality in 
economic and military terms in favour of the stronger belligerent side. Citing the case of Sweden, 
which allowed the transport of German troops through its territory, he argues that such states were 
legally non-belligerent rather than neutral, concluding, however, that, “because of these concessions, 
Sweden managed to stay out of the war even if it broke legal rules concerning neutrality”.25  
Constance Howard cites another example in the case of the Swiss, who also made concessions to the 
Axis side: “while the Swiss were determined to maintain their political independence and to defend 
their neutrality, the Government were obliged to make a number of concessions to Germany and 
Italy”.26  Thus, Rodrick Ogley surmises, “Sweden and Switzerland, like other successful neutrals, had 
to make concessions, in their case, largely to the Axis powers”.27 Ogley argues,  
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the fact that Sweden and Switzerland survived at all as neutrals in the Second World War says 
much for their diplomatic skill. Their problem, essentially, was to concede what had to be 
conceded to Axis powers, and no more, while making clear that they would fight against any 
wholesale assault on their independence.28  
 
Ogley concludes that “only Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland of the European States, 
preserved their neutrality throughout the war”.29  Thus, Ireland is included in the bracket of successful 
European neutral states in his analysis.  It also appears that Ireland did not have to make as severe 
concessions as other European neutrals – such as facilitating the transportation of British or German 
troops, as some other neutrals did - thus casting doubt over the argument made by Salmon and 
FitzGerald that Ireland’s neutrality is a myth because it was of a ‘less clear-cut’ type than that of 
Sweden or Switzerland. 
 
Impartiality and disavowal of external help 
 
Impartiality is a property of neutrality that Salmon finds lacking in the exercise of Irish neutrality: he 
argues “partiality to one side or the other is not simply to be added up and judged acceptable if the 
score comes out evenly at the bottom. There can be little doubt that the Irish engaged in unneutral acts 
and in partial behaviour”.30 Dwyer recounts that de Valera was cautious in providing measures that 
might appear to prove beneficial to one side, i.e. the British, more than the other side, and he had 
made changes to an exclusion order to include aircrafts and ships because, “if the policy were directed 
against U-boats alone, critics would charge that it was entirely anti-German”.31  Salmon also argues 
that an estimated forty thousand Irishmen from the Republic fighting in the British army “did infringe 
neutrality by its partiality”.32  This argument, however, runs contrary to the legal concept of neutrality, 
for example, the Swiss Doctrine of neutrality provides that neutrality is not conducted by private 
individuals. Therefore in a neutral country there is freedom of the press, and freedom to join an army 
if an individual so wishes.33   Furthermore, Salmon raises the question of whether involvement in the 
EEC and EPC is incompatible with impartiality, especially as Ireland has participated, along with 
other Community members, in imposing sanctions against various states on various occasions. Yet, 
the 1993 Swiss Federal Council report concluded “the law of neutrality does not render neutrality and 
participation in economic sanctions fundamentally incompatible”.34  Salmon makes a number of other 
arguments and suggests a number of incidents, actions, decisions and attitudes concerning talks, 
supplies, aid, trade, due diligence, disavowal of help and ideology that, he argues, means that Ireland 
was ‘unneutral’. Each of these points will be examined in detail below and a comparison made with 
the other European neutral states to establish whether Ireland has failed to live up to the same 
standards of these ‘clear-cut’, ‘genuine’, ‘established’ neutral states. 
Salmon argues that Ireland was unneutral during World War II on the basis of Irish 
participation in talks about a defence alliance.  He claims that “a number of talks with the British 
showed a clear partiality as regards disavowal of external help”,35 although there are assumptions 
underlying this claim.36 What of the behaviour of the other neutrals, such as Sweden and Norway? 
Those two neutral states also engaged in similar discussions, with some analysts claiming that Sweden 
had “made secret preparations for co-operating with the West in the event of Soviet aggression and 
neutrality failing”.37 Moreover, neutral Norway (at least up until the time the Nazis intervened to pre-
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empt Churchill’s landing of British troops)38 discussed a potential defence alliance; as Hicks recounts:  
 
the only occasion on which a slight relaxation of Koht’s strict conception of neutrality was 
noticeable was when he took part in deliberations on the possibility of a defensive alliance 
between the Scandinavian states and Finland after the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish Peace 
treaty of 12 March 1940.39  
 
What Salmon’s analysis fails to consider is that the accusations he levels at Irish neutrality are not 
unique to Ireland; in an effort to avoid participating in the war, all of the other European neutral states 
engaged in unneutral acts and were biased in favour of hostile or friendly neighbours. Even the 
‘British Representative’ in Ireland, Sir John Maffey, understood that De Valera’s “goal had been to 
maintain neutrality and to help us within the limits of that neutrality to the full extent possible”40, and 
he further understood that de Valera regarded his policy as consistent. 
Nevertheless, Salmon continues,  
 
the real question is whether the Irish reservation was sufficient to save their policy of 
neutrality. Preparations for and expectations of help certainly ran counter to the principles 
underpinning a policy ‘for neutrality’, as followed by Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.41  
 
Based on the evidence of the analysis so far, Irish neutrality is no different, no less ‘neutral’ than that 
of Austria, Sweden and Finland, Salmon’s paragon neutral states.  Thus, either Ireland is neutral 
because she compares well, or none of the other states are neutral and the model in the ‘Unneutral’ 
thesis has effectively defined the concept out of existence.  De Valera had said in the Dáil on 19th May 
1937 that he was willing to accept assistance from the British, “provided it was clear that the whole 
object of it was to maintain the inviolability of our territory”;42 in other words, so that the state and its 
independence could be protected. The then UK Minister for Health in the wartime Cabinet, Malcolm 
MacDonald, was sent to Dublin to try to persuade de Valera to allow British troops into Ireland to 
take over the ports - his advice was given “principally in the interests of Éire in itself”.43 Fisk 
surmises, “MacDonald must have realized that this was less than the truth; in her greatest moment of 
peril since Napoleon planned an invasion across the Channel, Britain was not offering her troops to 
Éire for de Valera’s benefit”.  In his response to each of the British proposals, de Valera emphatically 
rejected any possibility of ‘Éire’ abandoning her neutrality.44 The key point is that de Valera rejected 
the proposals of external help offered by the British out of a concern to preserve neutrality and the 
state. 
 
Due diligence and defence resources 
 
Salmon argues,  
 
it is difficult to say categorically what constitutes sufficient resources, but at sea and air the 
Irish clearly did not have ‘enough’, since they were incapable of preventing invasions into 
territorial waters and airspace, or violations of their neutrality. Their relative defencelessness 
meant that on occasion they did bend…with respect to ‘due diligence’ the Irish clearly 
defaulted, particularly in the air and at sea. The Irish objective was simply to avoid 
participation in the war. That is not neutrality.45  
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Before going into the detail of the “due diligence” accusation, it is worth pointing out, in reference to 
the last argument, that it is clear from this analysis that the other neutral states also had only one goal 
in mind - to avoid participating in the war - and this goal was pursued at the expense of many legal 
rules of neutrality. If Ireland is ‘unneutral’ on this basis, then all of the other states in this present 
analysis must also be ‘unneutral’.  
 
Fisk reasons that  
 
accidental encroachments into Irish territorial waters and a flood of refugees from Britain 
were the natural burdens of neutrality and de Valera could not have been surprised by these 
events. Éire was the only British dominion to choose neutrality – the rest of the 
Commonwealth followed Chamberlain’s lead by declaring war on Germany.46  
 
Salmon argues that airspace violations rendered Ireland unneutral, however, it is also the case that 
other European neutrals also suffered airspace violations, many of them committed by the British. 
Howard recounts the Swiss experience of airspace violations:  
 
since the summer of 1940, however, British bombers had repeatedly crossed Swiss territory 
on their way to attack north Italian towns and, in spite of repeated protests from the Swiss 
Government, this violation of Swiss air by British aviators continued. The Italians complained 
that Swiss illumination gave an unfair advantage to British bomber crews as it helped them to 
find their targets in northern Italy.47  
 
Norway also experienced airspace violations: Hicks describes how  
 
there were minor violations of Norwegian neutrality during this period, in the shape of flights 
by belligerent aircraft over Norwegian territory. Such incidents were always followed by 
prompt Norwegian protests to the offending Power when it was possible to identify the 
trespassing aircraft.48 
 
And in the post-war period, Schlesinger maintains that although lip service was paid to Austria’s 
armed neutrality, “…the words are rarely converted into expenditures and law”.49  Air defence was a 
particular weak spot: Austria’s “effective air defense has been virtually non-existent”, to the point that 
Austria was forced to protest to the United States over violations of its airspace during the Near East 
crisis.50 
 
Salmon further assesses,  
 
on land the situation was somewhat different, since throughout the duration the land area of 
the twenty-six counties remained inviolate. There was perhaps an element of 
deterrence…Certainly the Irish could have made wholesale occupation unprofitable.51  
 
De Valera’s determination for the state to remain inviolate will be dealt with below, in relation to 
defence resources and threats of invasion from Britain.  The Swiss were in much the same situation as 
Ireland, with an aggressive, hostile belligerent as a near neighbour in Germany, but they managed to 
stay out of the war despite similar threats of invasion:  
 
In 1943 the Government had real grounds for fear that German threats might indeed be 
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translated into action. Hitherto, also, although Hitler had been greatly irked by Switzerland’s 
continued independence and neutrality, the advantages which would have accrued from the 
invasion and conquest of Switzerland had been clearly outweighed by the drawbacks.  The 
Germans were aware that any attack would be strongly resisted by the Swiss.52  
 
The Irish government itself acknowledged that neutrality meant limited warfare with all belligerents. 
As Frank Aiken, the minister for the ‘Coordination of Defensive Measures’ said on 23 January 1940, 
“in the modern total warfare it [neutrality] is not a condition of peace with both belligerents, but rather 
a condition of limited warfare with both…”.53 De Valera added,  
 
neutrality if you are sincere about it means you will have to fight for your life against one side 
or the other – which ever attacks you first. Neutrality is not a cowardly policy if you really 
mean to defend yourself if attacked. Other nations have not gone crusading until they were 
attacked.54   
 
Defence expenditure and “costs of attack” 
 
Although, as mentioned earlier, Salmon admits, “it is difficult to say categorically what constitutes 
sufficient resources”,55 he does confirm that, “neutrals do, however, need the ability to deter by 
making the costs of attack too high, relatively, for the belligerent”.56 Salmon claims that the Irish 
position was undermined by de Valera’s recognition that Ireland was a small state and the equipment 
and arms required in modern wars were beyond a small state.57 These issues were also acknowledged 
by the small neutral states in mainland Europe. The notion that a certain level of arms means that a 
defence is 100% effective is a (neo)realist myth; no defence can be 100% effective and the Swedes 
and other World War II neutrals knew their defence limits too. The important fact is that de Valera 
pledged that Ireland would fight any incursion from any side, and the costs of attack were made high. 
This was acknowledged by both the Germans and the British.  
 
In January 1938 one of the questions put to the British chief of staff’s sub-committees 
included a question as to whether the importance of the Irish ports was so great as to warrant 
military operations to regain possession of them. The reply indicated that this would require a 
campaign of Gallipoli proportions if it were carried out in the face of opposition.58  
 
Duggan recalls de Valera’s contingency plans in 1938 that if Britain were to be an aggressor, 
“Ireland would make such aggression as costly as possible for Britain”.59 O’Halpin also admits that 
‘the evident determination of the Irish to resist any invader, however briefly, undoubtedly had some 
influence on British thinking’.60 He argues, ‘it can also fairly be said that, by as early as the spring of 
1941, the defence forces were sufficiently well organised to provide sustained resistance to British 
action’.61  On 14 December 1941 Hempel confirmed de Valera’s reiterated determination to defend 
Irish neutrality....‘not an inch’ of Irish territory was for sale.62  It is worth noting that the strategy of 
other neutral states, such as Austria, was also based on the strategy of “the highest possible price of 
entry”, with relatively low levels of defence expenditure.63 Thus, de Valera had shown comparatively 
sufficient due diligence and defence resource preparations to make the perceived costs of occupation 
too high for belligerents, an achievement he shared with the other neutral states.  
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What Salmon’s analysis (in particular the charge regarding Ireland’s lack of arms) fails to 
acknowledge sufficiently is the British and American refusals of de Valera’s requests for arms.64  
Duggan recalls, “it was difficult if not impossible in the circumstances to procure weapons. Britain 
was obstructive; the US was unco-operative. ...Still the realisation that the Irish would resist with 
whatever weapons they had was a bottom line deterrent: there was a long tradition of taking the pikes 
down from the thatch”.65 Dwyer also documents the almost vicious responses to de Valera’s pleas for 
arms from the Allied sides, coupled with the belligerents’ threats to invade Ireland given the poor 
defence capabilities of the army: “with the British, the American President stymied every suggestion 
to supply additional arms to the Irish army”.66 O’Halpin also notes that ‘efforts to secure arms in the 
United States also fell on deaf ears, primarily because of Roosevelt’s hostility to Irish neutrality’.67  
And David Gray, the United States representative in Dublin during the war years and a confidant of 
the American President (Gray was also related to Eleanor Roosevelt by marriage to her aunt), made 
the threat from the Third Reich seem remote by comparison: “Allied troops were already poised on 
Irish soil and Gray had an insensitive amateur’s appetite for action”.68 Fisk also recounts that  
 
de Valera’s persistent, occasionally frantic quest for weapons was to be a consistent theme of 
Irish foreign policy over the coming years, a search that was principally directed towards the 
belligerent powers and which was thus always rewarded by demands which would – if met – 
totally compromise Éire’s neutrality. In return for guns, the British wanted the use of the 
Treaty ports, the Americans wanted Irish participation in the war, and the Germans – less 
ambitious because there was little else to be gained – wanted a closer relationship between 
Dublin and Berlin. Denuded of weapons, Éire’s refusal to participate in the war was no longer 
just an assertion of sovereignty; from now on, the policy had to prove successful in keeping 
Éire out of the war.69 
 
Supplies, trade and economic dependence 
 
Because there were exchanges of food for military supplies across the Northern Ireland border, a lack 
of a ‘strategic reserve’ and a dependence on other countries’ shipping for imports of wheat, maize, 
petroleum and bulk cargoes, Salmon claims “third parties” saw room for influence and manoeuvre, 
and doubted the credibility of Irish neutrality.70 On the other hand, Fisk regards de Valera’s 
prioritizing of food supplies and external trade, followed by censorship, counterespionage and coast-
watching, over military measures and air-raid precautions as  
 
an authentic policy of neutrality, the desire to maintain the country’s commercial life and 
safeguard its political integrity from external pressures, while taking only minimum defence 
precautions on the grounds that neutrality – if strictly adhered to – would obviate the need for 
enormous military expenditure.71  
 
In fact, de Valera turned down trade agreements with Britain in order to safeguard Irish neutrality:  
 
in November the war cabinet was told that Éire had rejected the storage and trans-shipment 
proposals as being incompatible with neutrality and from fears that they would provoke 
German attacks on the ports if not on the country as a whole. Ireland’s refusal of the trade 
agreement may have left her vulnerable to the British economic pressure, but the refusal also 
sealed off a potential serious breach in Ireland’s neutrality and nothing was more important 
for de Valera.72 
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Although Salmon is right to point out that Ireland was vulnerable, if this vulnerability renders 
Ireland ‘unneutral’, then Salmon must retract his understanding of Switzerland, Sweden and others as 
neutral, because those states experienced similar difficulties.  Howard points out that although the 
Swiss, with the exception of a minority of fanatics and defeatists, were resolved to maintain their 
political independence, economically they were obliged to align themselves much more closely with 
Hitler’s Europe.73  After the fall of France, Switzerland was economically at the mercy of the Axis, 
which controlled practically all ways in and out of Switzerland. In a trade agreement reached on 9 
August 1940, Germany undertook to supply her with certain quantities of raw materials, of which the 
most vital were coal and iron. In return, Swiss industry was to supply Germany with goods required 
for her war effort.74 The Swiss neutrality doctrine states that the neutral country is entitled to trade 
with belligerents; the neutral country has merely to submit to certain encroachments by the 
belligerents, e.g. a blockade. According to the 1954 Swiss Ministry doctrine, “the rules adopted by 
Switzerland during the last war of maintaining the normal level and an adequate consideration in trade 
were voluntarily elected economic principles of its own”.75  
Norway had to deal with a similar situation: “Norway continued to maintain commercial 
relations with both belligerents – though this to a decreasing extent, and at the price of incurring both 
Germany and Franco-British displeasure”.76 It is held that Swedish neutrality during World War Two 
was compromised by its trade with Nazi Germany77, whilst Austria’s leading trade partners were 
Germany and Italy.78 The point is that although there is some support for Salmon’s claims that Ireland 
was non-belligerent in the Second World War because of dependent trade relations or concessions 
made or assistance given, this analysis shows that Salmon must withdraw his definition of 
Switzerland and Sweden as being neutral, and to re-brand those states as non-belligerent, because 
those states failed the same criteria more severely than Ireland is alleged to have failed them.  Finally, 
other academics have argued that the analyses painting a picture of Ireland during the war as simply a 
British satellite, entirely dependent for national survival on Britain’s good will, is not accurate; as 
O’Halpin contends, ‘even in the spheres of trade and commerce, it is more accurate to characterise the 
relationship as one of interdependence’.79  
 
“Non-belligerency” and official belligerent acknowledgement of Irish neutrality 
 
Salmon claims that because the British didn’t guarantee not to invade Ireland and refused to officially 
recognise Ireland as a neutral state, Irish neutrality was not possible. He argues, “neutrality does not 
come into existence until recognized by both belligerents”,80 and therefore Ireland was ‘unneutral’; he 
does, however, concede that “on occasion there was a certain apparent de facto recognition of the 
Irish position”.81 It is notable that Hitler did not guarantee not to invade Switzerland,82 and yet Salmon 
regards Switzerland as neutral. 
The British always refused to acknowledge Ireland’s neutrality and preferred to use the term 
‘non-belligerency’, because Ireland was still a member of the Commonwealth. As Fisk recounts,  
 
a formal recognition of Éire’s neutrality presented a serious difficulty, said Eden83, because 
‘we do not want formally to recognize Éire as neutral while Éire remains a member of the 
British Commonwealth’. This would surrender the ‘constitutional theory of the indivisibility 
of the Crown’.84  
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Duggan’s account of this period states,  
 
the [German] Envoy had reported Allied pressure to change the Irish neutrality posture to a 
stance of technical nonbelligerency, which would be designed, he said, to permit the Allies to 
use the ports”.85 
 
Therefore, regardless of the language the British government used because of political considerations, 
it was recognised by both the British and German sides that Ireland was indeed ‘neutral’, and this 
legal, official stance could only turn into “non-belligerency” if troops were allowed in (as in the 
example of Sweden cited by Pentillä above). 
Britain’s official view of Ireland’s status emerged during times when the British government 
tried to persuade the Irish government to allow British soldiers into Ireland. MacDonald offered,  
 
we would be content for Éire to remain non-belligerent if she invited our ships into her ports 
and our troops and aeroplanes into her territory to increase her security against the fate which 
had befallen neutral Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg.86  
 
Whereas MacDonald avoided the word ‘neutrality’ throughout these meetings,87 in fact there was 
‘official British’ recognition of Ireland’s neutral status in various forums, although many were off-
record.  
There are several examples of this “certain apparent de facto recognition of ”88 Ireland’s 
neutrality by Britain. For example, Duff Cooper, the UK Minister for Information, made a speech in 
May 1941 in which he  
 
had been rash enough to state that however deeply and disastrously Britain suffered from Irish 
neutrality, ‘we respect the independence of Éire and allow them to remain neutral while we 
are fighting for our lives. That shows Great Britain abides by her word’.89  
 
Fisk also tells us that 
 
when Hugh Dalton, the president of the British Board of Trade, told the House of Commons 
that ‘in view of her neutrality, Éire cannot expect the same considerations as those who are at 
war with the common enemy’, the Irish Department of Supplies not unnaturally concluded 
that this ‘quite clearly indicates that because of our neutrality we are being subjected to a 
“squeeze”’.90  
 
In a War Cabinet memorandum, Viscount Cranbourne, the UK Dominions Secretary from 1940-2, 
described life in “Southern Ireland” as very uncomfortable, and stated that the discomfort “is a direct 
result of her neutrality”.91  When Cranbourne informed Churchill of a request for arms from de Valera 
in a cover note attached to a dispatch from Maffey, Churchill replied,  
 
no attempt should be made to conceal from Mr de Valera the depth and intensity of feeling 
against the policy of Irish neutrality. We have tolerated and acquiesced in it, but juridically 
we have never recognized that Southern Ireland is an independent Sovereign State, and she 
herself has repudiated Dominion Status. Her international status is undefined and 
anomalous.92 
 
The issue behind British refusal to officially acknowledge Ireland’s neutrality was largely 
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inspired by Churchill’s imperialist attitude towards Ireland. Fisk reports,  
 
there is, throughout Churchill’s writing and speeches at this period, an ill-concealed 
impatience with the Irish that sometimes turns into contempt. Above all, there was his notion 
that by rejecting the Oath of Allegiance, de Valera’s Ireland might somehow legally cease to 
exist. It was a very disturbing idea to have been gestating in the mind of a future British Prime 
Minister.93  
 
At the time described by Fisk, Churchill,  
 
still smarting over the Anglo-Irish rapprochement of 1938 [Chamberlain’s decision to hand 
the Treaty Ports back to de Valera]…also brought with him to the Admiralty his profound 
distrust of de Valera’s young state….Here, clearly, would be no friend of a neutral Éire. So it 
was to turn out, for as Britain went to war against Germany, Churchill’s contempt for Éire’s 
political status surfaced almost at once. Only two days after the British declaration of war, he 
ordered the Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, to compile a special 
report ‘upon the questions arising from the so-called neutrality of the so-called Éire’.94  
 
On foot of this request, Sir William Malkin, the UK Foreign Office Legal Advisor, wrote a 
ten-page report (it was classified top secret and was never seen by de Valera) on the legal aspects of 
Irish neutrality and the Treaty ports, which amounted to  
 
‘as blunt an acknowledgement of Éire’s juridical right to remain neutral as had yet come from 
a British Government official’. Malkin went on to define the complexities of Irish neutrality 
in a way that morally precluded any British action against Éire.95  
 
Anthony Eden added to the report by hand:  
 
I fear that it becomes every day clearer that it is scarcely possible for “Dev” to square 
neutrality with the grant of the facilities for which the Admiralty ask. And at least 80% of the 
Irish people favour neutrality. Altogether a pretty problem.96  
 
Churchill responded to the paper in a way that  
 
revealed the extent of Churchill’s disturbing obsession about Ireland: he did not just throw 
doubt on the international validity of Irish neutrality. He was questioning Éire’s very right to 
exist as a separate and independent state97....seventeen months later, Churchill had become 
possessed of the idea that Éire had no international rights at all.98  
 
Thus, the refusal by ‘Britain’ to recognise the neutrality of Ireland was in effect, Churchill’s 
refusal to recognise Ireland as a sovereign state, and this was the real dynamic behind Salmon’s 
argument that  
 
the British never simply accepted the 1939 Irish aide-mémoire and throughout the war refused 
to recognize the Irish position formally. Moreover, there was lacking not only a guarantee of 
respect for Irish neutrality but also a guarantee not to invade Irish territory: this latter 
omission was quite deliberate.99  
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Germany did officially recognise Ireland’s neutrality; hours before Germany’s invasion of Poland, 
“on the instructions of Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, Hempel told de Valera 
that Germany would respect Éire’s neutrality.100 
 
Protective umbrella and “relying on Britain” 
 
Salmon’s thesis claims that “the Irish relied on a protective umbrella supplied by the British”101 and 
that “during the war there was no consistent Irish disavowal of external help…there still remained a 
belief in the protective umbrella”.102 Salmon is employing a classic (neo)realist myth in his use of the 
concept of a protective umbrella to argue that Ireland is ‘unneutral’. His argument is feasible in a 
different sense, in terms of seeking help to prevent an attack, as a speech by de Valera on 5 October 
1943 illustrates. On that occasion, the taoiseach reasserted in tones reminiscent of a 1940 speech 
recalled earlier, that if Ireland were attacked by one side, Ireland would seek aid from the other. In 
this sense, the notion of a protective umbrella applies equally to the other major belligerent in the 
War, Germany, as it does to Britain.  Regardless, as Duggan points out, “this did not indicate any 
overt change in maintaining the policy of neutrality”.103  
Salmon’s argument may also be resting on the notion that the Germans would have to 
overcome Britain before launching an invasion of Ireland, but that argument does not hold either, 
given the inability of the British to defend Belfast and the indications of German plans to occupy 
Ireland directly. Fisk posits,  
 
if the British could not even defend Belfast and protect these people, how could they possibly 
have guaranteed Dublin’s safety under air attack if Éire had allied herself to Britain in 
1940?”104  
 
and the British themselves, through MacDonald, put it to de Valera that a German invasion of Ireland 
might precede an invasion of Britain.105 Thus, the notion that Ireland was relying on Britain to protect 
her from a German invasion does not stand up to scrutiny, because Britain was simply incapable of 
defending any part of Ireland from the Axis aggressors.  Furthermore, it was the British that were 
most hostile to Ireland and her policy of neutrality throughout the Second World War. In an 
interesting reversal of the ‘protective umbrella’ thesis argued by Salmon and others,106 after the blitz 
of the British cities began, there were  
 
rumours that the North [of Ireland]’s freedom from attack could be put down to the fact ‘that 
de Valera has indicated to the German embassy that Ireland is to be regarded as a whole’ and 
there was ‘a belief that the neutrality of the South would somehow cast a protective shield 
over Northern Ireland’.107   
 
Salmon was cited earlier as drawing attention to the fact that Churchill was very careful not to 
acknowledge or guarantee Irish neutrality; in fact, Churchill threatened to invade Ireland several times 
and made reference to these intentions in his victory speech after the War ended. Fisk argues that, as 
early as 1940, “Éire now believed that a British invasion was more likely than a German attack”.108 
British Cabinet records show that, in the event of an enemy invasion of Ireland, Churchill proposed 
plans to gas the Irish population, as he was prepared to use poison gas against other populations 
during World War II. As Chomsky points out,  
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as Secretary of State of the War Office in 1919, Winston Churchill was enthusiastic about the 
prospects of ‘using poisoned gas against uncivilised tribes’ – Kurds and Afghans – and 
authorized the RAF Middle East command to use chemical weapons ‘against recalcitrant 
Arabs as [an] experiment’, dismissing objections by the India office as ‘unreasonable’ and 
deploring the ‘squeamishness about the use of gas…’.109  
 
The validity of “the Irish” relying on Salmon’s (neo)realist concept of a British protective umbrella is 
undermined by the fact that “de Valera was never able to rule out the possibility of British attack”.110   
Throughout the War, de Valera did not know which side was going to be the first to launch an 
invasion of Ireland and he had to make plans to tackle both the Germans and the British, and also the 
Americans. Fisk reports that in June 1944 “Éire thought she might be invaded by American troops”.111 
Duggan recounts that,  
 
Hempel passed on the following British secret service report: in their judgement the Irish 
army was very good, in spite of a shortage of armament; that factor meant that a large force 
of, say, 100,000 men would be required for a quick occupation of Ireland”112  
 
and that Hempel felt a British attack had to be reckoned with113 - “de Valera did not exaggerate when 
he stressed the threat from both sides”.114 Fisk confirms that, “the Irish Government anticipated not 




Salmon quotes FitzGerald who said in 1980, “there really isn’t such a thing as neutrality today: we are 
part of Western Europe and our interests coincide with theirs”116 and he argues the fact that Ireland’s 
profession of itself as not neutral between ideologies (i.e. between Western values and Communism) 
violates neutrality. However, the other neutral states also declared they were part of Western Europe 
and shared the associated values. Hakovirta states “the neutrals identify themselves ideologically with 
the West”.117 Schlesinger notes Austrian foreign policy’s general identification with the West as a 
value system118 with significant economic and cultural relations with Germany119 and that Austria’s 
neutrality was a consequence of a Soviet-Austrian understanding.120  Furthermore, Schlesinger points 
to an analyst who declared that Austria and Switzerland, as two ‘alpine neutrals’, had been “more 
Western than the West”.121  Keatinge notes that Finland has a consideration for the Soviet Union, 
mirroring Ireland’s consideration for the United States, and argues that Sweden and Switzerland are 
“essentially oriented to the west”.122 Andrén clarifies this in more detail;  
 
Sweden has never sought to assume a neatly balanced position in all major respects between 
the superpowers or between the power blocs. The Swedish policy of neutrality is related only 
to security, not to ideology, economic relations, or other aspects of international affairs. 
Sweden has repeatedly and emphatically rejected the idea of ideological neutrality.123  
 
McSweeney argues “the law, for what it is worth, places no barrier to neutrality for a nation which is 
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ideologically close to one of the belligerents. Nor does it demand ideological impartiality even during 
a war”.124 He argues that impartiality is not with respect to ideology or culture, but the likely 





There were other issues alleged to violate or vilify Irish neutrality that continue to crop up in the 
national public discourse that are worth examining: specifically, the allegations regarding a deal 
offered by the British government on Northern Ireland and the matter of de Valera offering 
condolences on Hitler’s death. After the bombing of Pearl Harbour, Churchill sent a telegram to de 
Valera, which the latter understood to be a  
 
coded offer of a united Ireland in return for the abandonment of neutrality. It was apparently 
one of a large number of euphoric telegrams which Churchill had fired off to all corners of the 
globe in the wake of America’s entry to the war. De Valera’s habitual reserve stood him in 
good stead at that moment: neither then nor later did he seriously entertain Churchill’s 
offer…in truth, he had his mind made up on his preference for neutrality.125 
 
Fisk also shows that even if a united Ireland came about through the negotiations proposed by the 
British government, de Valera would not have allowed Ireland to join the war.  He describes how 
Mulcahy asked de Valera five days after the meeting with MacDonald, “if he would be prepared 
in…an All-Ireland Parliament to advocate and support going into the war against Germany. And de 
Valera ‘stated that he would not’”.126 De Valera surmised, “we are, of course, aware that the policy of 
neutrality has its dangers, but, on the other hand, departure from it would involve us in dangers 
greater still”.127 It was Craigavon (the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland) who implied in public that 
the initiative for Irish unity in return for the abandonment of the neutrality policy had come not from 




Mansergh recounts, “the rigid formalistic adherence to the letter of neutrality, which found significant 
expression on many occasions, caused much misunderstanding of Éire’s position even among the 
members of the united nations most friendly to her”.129 One such occasion concerns de Valera’s 
“formal call of condolence on the German Minister on 3 May 1945” after the end of the war.130 This 
incident is a central part of the anti-neutrality discourse of the past 35 years and is continually cited in 
the context of arguments that seek to undermine positive adherence to Irish neutrality by members of 
the Irish public (particularly those who have vetoed EU treaties in the 2001 Nice Treaty referendum 
and 2008 Lisbon Treaty referendum in an attempt to protect Irish neutrality). Discourse theorists are 
concerned with looking at ‘play of practice’: in particular, the efforts of agents to articulate and re-
articulate a particular version of an event so that it will become sedimented as a ‘regime of truth’, 
pointing to a singular ‘common sense’ policy practice.131  They are also concerned with examining the 
genealogy of a dominant discourse and with making space for the subjugated alternative than the 
dominant discourse, thus to make space for other logical policy avenues to the dominant one.132  This 
article will now focus on these efforts to stabilize and fix particular meanings of neutrality and will 
critique the genealogy of the ‘book of condolences’ myth.   
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This ‘book of condolences’ myth is widespread: it is part of mainstream publicly-available 
accounts of Irish neutrality.  For example, it appears in the first and highest ranked article in a Google 
search on “Irish neutrality”133; it arises in tourist guides’ talks;134 it is cited by secondary school 
students of history;135 it is a constant in public and political discourse in Ireland;136 and it is part of 
media discourse on Irish neutrality abroad.137  Its ubiquity is connected to the activities of a significant 
number of anti-neutrality academics, politicians and journalists, such as Salmon, FitzGerald, Roberts, 
Girvin and Collins, who continue to publicize and promote the story that de Valera went to the 
German Legation in order to sign a book of condolences and/or to sympathize over the death of 
Hitler.   
There are three core untruths in this collection of discourses:  
(1) de Valera went to the home of Eduard Hempel, the German Minister in Ireland 
from 1937 to 1945, not to the German legation (the legation was the equivalent of a 
German Embassy at that time). This is an important detail, because the claim that de 
Valera went to the Legation obscures the fact that the central purpose of the visit was 
of a personal nature.  
(2) De Valera did not sign a book of condolences.  There is no academic evidence in 
the historical literature that this book existed.  There is no material evidence, in terms 
of the book itself or pictures of signatures.  Neither polemic nor disinterested 
academic accounts have referenced a source that accounts for the book’s existence.  
(3) De Valera’s visit was an act of courtesy, rather than a call of condolence.  He 
visited Hempel out of personal consideration for him because, with Hitler’s death and 
the end of the war, the British and Americans would seek the removal of Hempel138 
and de Valera wanted to assure him that he and his family would be given appropriate 
diplomatic protection and asylum in Ireland. Thus, it appears that although Hitler’s 
death prompted the visit, it was not the focus of it.  
 
But what is the evidence upon which to base these three arguments, and a further argument that the 
claims made in the discourses above regarding the location of the meeting and indeed, the purpose of 
it, are undoubtedly connected to negative attitudes towards Irish neutrality and a desire to fulfil 
alternative security and defence policy ambitions? 
John P. Duggan’s account of the visit appears to be the only historical (and more importantly, 
referenced) account that is based on independent, primary evidence.  According to Duggan, who 
personally interviewed Hempel’s wife in Ireland, “it took Frau Hempel to put the record straight as to 
the location of the visit. The Taoiseach had visited Hempel’s home rather than the legation”.139 Was 
the purpose of de Valera’s visit to sign a book of condolences?  According to Duggan’s account, de 
Valera paid a visit out of consideration for Hempel140– “the German minister, who deduced his 
mission as being the preservation of Irish neutrality”,141 who was “a great favourite of Dev’s because 
he had fought against any German infringement of Irish neutrality” – and because it was the right 
thing to do.142  His attitude to “the displaced German diplomat” was “charitable and understanding. 
He granted asylum to him and his family”.143 De Valera defended his decision to grant Hempel 
asylum against British and American pressure to do otherwise.144   
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Is there other primary evidence that might contradict this account?  There appears to be little 
official pronouncements to analyse, as de Valera would not make any public comment on the visit.145  
There are two ‘official’ sources that are relied upon by commentators and academics,146 included in 
more recently published accounts by Brian Girvin147 and Clair Wills148, in their discussions of the 
visit:  
 
(1) a Dáil statement made by de Valera on 19 July 1945149 and  
(2) a letter written by de Valera in a private correspondence to the Washington-based Robert 
Brennan.150   
 
Notably, the word ‘condolences’ is absent from the letter text cited; de Valera used the word 
‘courtesy’.  The same is also true of the Dáil statement; de Valera never used the word ‘condolences’, 
he used the words ‘courtesy’ and ‘courtesies’.151  Whilst it is undoubtedly reasonable to assume that 
de Valera went to Hempel to express condolences, (1) given that de Valera himself invoked 
established procedure and practice152 as justification in response to criticism of the visit, and (2) 
discussion by others in the Dáil referred to ‘condolences’, remarkably, the primary evidence cited in 
all of the academic analyses to date does not support this specific interpretation.  
The political context of the interpretation of the event is the fact that de Valera knew that his 
personal visit would be deliberately misrepresented by the British and the Americans (who waged 
vicious propaganda wars against Irish neutrality153); turning to the two primary sources for evidence 
of this context, de Valera noted in the letter to Brennan that his visit had been ‘played up to the 
utmost’154 by the British and the Americans; and in his Dáil Éireann statement he pointed to the spin 
of the ‘propagandists’ who were displeased with Ireland’s neutrality and sought to ‘malign’ and 
‘misrepresent’ the country.155  Brian Girvin points out that senior members of the British government 
and news media refused to accept the terms of de Valera’s visit,156 which explains the hostile British 
press campaign ‘spinning’ the visit, despite de Valera’s protestations that Sir John Maffey, ‘knew as 
well as he did how opposed he was personally to the Nazi regime’.157 These points form an 
improbable basis for claiming de Valera sought to express condolences on Hitler’s death. 
Interestingly, Aengus Nolan’s account argues that, privately, Maffey had acknowledged that “while 
the visit to Hempel was abhorrent to him and to many others, the Taoiseach was ‘mathematically 
correct’ and consistent in making the visit”.158  Maffey felt that de Valera wanted to show that he was 
no ‘bandwagoner’ in the light of the Allied victory.159 
There remain important aspects of the event that are contradicted across various academic 
analyses, for example, Clair Wills writes that “Hempel himself was apparently bewildered by the 
visit”,160 whereas according to Duggan’s primary account, the Hempels “had expected that Mr. de 
Valera would visit them and were also aware that he would be letting himself in for trouble by doing 
so”.161  Drawing on de Valera’s Dáil statement, Duggan recounts that de Valera felt  
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that it was important that it should never be inferred that these formal acts imply the passing 
of judgements, good or bad, on the Third Reich. He was quite sure that he had acted correctly 
and wisely162  
 
and concludes his analysis by noting “[t]he Hempels were grateful for de Valera’s consideration and 
helping hand.  He was indeed a friend in need”.163 
 
The ‘book of condolences’/‘condolences’ myth is undoubtedly widespread and consistently 
repeated, although, tellingly, this genealogical analysis shows that none of the primary sources relied 
on by the historians citing the few words from de Valera referring to the visit involve ‘condolences’.  
Girvin titled the first chapter of his account of Irish neutrality “Condolences on Hitler’s Death”, 
indicating a remarkable devotion of space and priority to the event given the scope of the history of 
Irish neutrality. This indicates a rather obvious anti-neutrality political position, one that the author 
acknowledges in the preface to his book: “I was an active proponent of European integration, 
believing that Ireland should join NATO..”.164 The same pattern is found in relation to Garret 
FitzGerald, who argued that “military neutrality is immoral” and initiated and carried on a series of 
columns in the Irish Independent advocating Irish membership of NATO.165 Later, as Ireland’s 
minister for foreign affairs, FitzGerald ensured the perpetuity of the condolences story by passing it 
on to other EC Foreign Ministers.166   
The debate continues in recent historical texts, but what this analysis seeks to highlight is that 
history is political, particularly the history of Irish neutrality.  In the absence of readers’ own 
independent investigations of the primary sources referenced by the above academics, whose 
interpretation of the event would the reader choose to believe?  Current historians and academics who 
faithfully maintain the condolences discourse, although some of whom have expressed their personal 
hatred of Irish neutrality? Or the past generation of politicians and diplomats, who were agents with 
political and personal agendas towards neutrality, such as the Germans who wanted to maintain it and 
the Americans and British who wanted to end it?  For discourse theorists, it is important to offer the 
‘subjugated’ knowledge and interpretation of an event, particularly in the face of unrelenting 
repetitions of myths involving manipulation of the truth, ignorance of primary evidence and disregard 
of political context due to an underlying agenda; evidence and context that can provide an alternative 




Salmon argues that the act of joining the EEC in 1973 cast doubt on the principle of Irish neutrality 
because Ireland “accepted…the political objectives of the Community, including political unification 
and a European identity…and the need ultimately to partake in Community defence”.167 Twelve years 
after the initial application, the EEC agreed to accept Ireland as a member, and the Irish government 
put the proposal to the people through a referendum. The 1972 public debate on EEC membership 
concentrated on the economic implications of membership168 and although the question of the 
possible political consequences was raised, the consequences were not explored in any depth.169 The 
government took the line that defence co-operation was a consequence and not a pre-condition of 
political union, and that it would only arise when economic integration was complete. In the campaign 
in the run-up to the 1972 referendum, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael reiterated the line that there was no 
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threat to Irish neutrality, and that, in any case, neutrality was accidental, ad hoc, temporary and 
conditional.170  
The then Taoiseach and leader of Fianna Fáil, Jack Lynch, said Ireland would defend others 
in the Community and that Ireland had no traditional policy of neutrality like Sweden and 
Switzerland, and nor did Ireland’s neutrality compare with Austria’s declaration of permanent 
neutrality.171 The Labour Party, traditionally a defender of Irish neutrality, was the only large political 
party to campaign against membership. As Salmon points out,  
 
Successive government declarations did not help to clarify the issue: they emphasised the 
legal position when referring to neutrality, but Irish moral and political obligations when 
referring to Community commitment. A distinction was drawn between current and future 
commitments, and between the Community and an alliance.172 
 
However, Salmon goes on to argue that this acceptance was the position not only at the elite level:  
 
underneath these statements lay a public recognition and acceptance that at some time in the 
future, and conditional upon certain developments, Ireland would join in the defence of the 
Community. The problem arose from a reluctance to accept the corollary, namely that such a 
position involved the abandonment of neutrality.173  
 
This is a rather confident statement regarding the state of public opinion given that Salmon does not 
consider public opinion as a substantive concern in his analysis of Irish neutrality and does not cite 
any primary evidence in support of this claim.  
Is Salmon’s thesis that the Irish people accepted that Ireland would take up membership of a 
European military alliance true? With regard to public opinion at that time, other perspectives imply 
there is no case to answer, because in the public debate over Irish membership any incompatibility of 
these goals [of EU membership and neutrality] did not appear to have been pressed home to the Irish 
public.174 Keatinge argues  
 
the decisive vote of the electorate in favour of membership of the European Community is 
explained by the quantifiable expectations of economic gain rather than by views, one way or 
another, on neutrality.175  
 
According to Hederman, the Irish population had not decided its preferences on the limits of 
European integration, and Irish people were no different to other member-state populations in this 
respect.176 EEC Eurobarometer opinion poll data supports this view.177 
Keatinge’s and Hederman’s analysis of the debate on EEC membership is corroborated by 
members of the public exposed to the campaigns of the political parties at the time. In 1995 one such 
member of the public, Mr. Desmond Curley, wrote a letter to the Editor of the Irish Times newspaper 
to point out that the former Taoiseach, Dr. Garret FitzGerald, together with the Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael political parties, deliberately minimised the debate on security implications in their campaigns 
for people to vote ‘yes’ in the referendum on Ireland’s membership of the EEC in 1973.178 The 
comparative international literature on neutrality also confirms this version of events: Karsh notes 
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“the dismissive attitude of the Irish proponents of EEC membership to the possibility of Ireland’s 
entanglement within the political and military designs of the European Communities”.179 Hakovirta 
also opines that  
 
the question of neutrality was never very important in the arguments presented by the Irish 
government for EC membership, or even in the Irish EC debate in general. It was basically 
seen as a limited question of non-membership in military alliances. The government argued 




Salmon’s conclusion that Ireland’s neutrality does not exist181 has spread into and seemingly taken 
root in the mainstream academic discourse on Irish neutrality, and is echoed in the media discourse. 
The approach Salmon has taken in evaluating a state’s neutrality according to a legalistic, 
prescriptive, sortal definition has effectively defined neutrality out of existence, because any empirical 
evaluation of a state’s neutrality shows discrepancies between theoretical and legal prescriptions and 
state practices. The comparative analysis undertaken in this article demonstrates the failure of all 
neutral states to fulfil the criteria of neutrality proposed in the “Unneutral Ireland” thesis. The 
assertion by many academics that Ireland’s neutrality is questionable because it does not mirror the 
clarity of the concept reflected in the practice of other European neutral states is therefore falsified 
through this comparative analysis. Tonra summarises the ‘unneutral’ thesis as one in which Ireland’s 
“neutrality has been dismissed as an almost adolescent effort to distinguish the state from its ancient 
enemy (Salmon, 1989)”.182 Arguably the Unneutral thesis’s effort to understand and give a fair 
account of Irish neutrality falls short in a comparative, empirical context. 
Neutrality is a concept needing evaluation in relation to the particular time in which it exists 
and the situation thereof. Jessup and Deak illustrate this point:  
 
it may be well to suggest a distinction between the factors contributing to the creation of these 
rules of the international law of neutrality rights and the factors conditioning their application. 
It is apparent that economic necessities and opportunities and political alignments moved the 
states of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to embrace and advocate particular rules. But 
the rules having once come into vogue often developed into a servant stronger than the 
master. The rules became part of the factual situation which statesmen had to take into 
account in shaping their policies from time to time. This was true because the rules were 
themselves the reflection of economic and political realities.183 
 
Thus, many empirical differences in the conduct of neutrality are argued to legitimately exist, and are 
rationally explicable in the context of state interests, the external environment and perceived 
associated demands. Evaluations and conclusions as to a state’s neutrality based on a particular 
definition will always be questionable, because the concept is fundamentally essentially contested.  
What is clear is that Ireland’s practice of neutrality was arguably as clear-cut, legally circumspect, and 
sufficiently deterring, credible, recognised and respected, as that of the other neutral European states 
during the Second World War, if not more so.  As a result, the current elite strategy to discredit Irish 
neutrality through incomplete comparative or ideological analyses of the practice of Irish neutrality, 
and to claim on the basis of such analyses that the public has ‘illusions’ about the nature of Irish 
neutrality184 during the Second World War is undermined.  
Neutrality is a complex policy, in theory and in practice, and tends to be universally hated by 
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all sides.  The Americans waged an unscrupulous campaign in the press against Irish neutrality,185 as 
did the British. As Frank Aiken, the Irish Minister for the Coordination of Defensive Measures, put it 
in January 1940:  
 
neutrality is not like a simple mathematical formula which has only to be announced and 
demonstrated in order to be believed and respected…instead of earning the respect and 
goodwill of both belligerents it is regarded by both with hatred and contempt, ‘He who is not 
with me is against me’. In the modern total warfare it is not a condition of peace with both 
belligerents, but rather a condition of limited warfare with both…186  
 
In these perennial circumstances, it will always be difficult to achieve an ‘unbiased’ analysis of 
Ireland’s neutrality. 
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